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The Future of the European Defence Industry 
 after the December Summit:  
Ten Polish Priorities 
Paulina Zamelek1 
December’s European Council Summit for heads of state or government has been tasked to deliberate 
European defence industry issues based on proposals provided by the European Commission.  
A divergence of interests expressed by interlocutors representing Member States, national defence 
industries and European institutions could result in heated political debate. The ability to accommodate 
the interests of Central Eastern Europe and Poland in particular in this process is not yet certain, 
especially as the EU’s ambitious plans for strengthening the European Defence Technological and 
Industrial Base (EDTIB) are discordant with the current level playing field across Europe. 
There is still a lack of agreed vision and direction for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Of 
course, the EU has long been at a crossroads, unable to decide whether to become a global player or to 
remain a mainly economic union. But today, that dilemma has sharpened. Any ambitions to become  
a credible security actor, responsible for the EU’s foreign interests and capable of meeting new challenges, 
clashes not just with the EU’s current tasking but with the absence of an effective European Defence 
Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).  
A succession of financial crises had already shrunk the European defence market, forcing European 
companies to look to the global defence market for the instruments necessary for their survival. Now 
economic austerity is eroding national defence budgets, too. This has dashed hopes for a revised trend, and 
intensified competition on export markets among all of the defence companies, pushing them to resort to 
the optimisation of their capabilities and exploration of new defence niches.  
That may be beginning to change. After defence issues had lain dormant in the EU for half a decade, and any 
progress in the defence industry area had proved sluggish and ad hoc, new political momentum was given in 
the European Council conclusions of 13–14 December 2012. Out of the three priority areas foreseen for 
the European Council planned for 19–20 December 2013,2 the European defence industry issue features 
                                                          
 
1 Paulina Zamelek is attached to the Armaments Policy Department, Polish Ministry of National Defence. The views presented in 
this paper, though, reflect the personal opinions of the author. 
2 The agenda foresees three axes of priority actions: one, increasing the operational effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP; 
two, enhancing the development of defence capabilities; and, three, strengthening Europe's defence industry. 
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most prominently, with high expectations that a breakthrough here will increase awareness of CSDP and 
political will.  
The summit is focusing primarily on revitalising existing proposals and the likelihood of consensus lies in 
maximizing synergies between the European Commission’s proposals and the interests of other players—
especially the European Defence Agency (EDA), the private sector and, of course, national governments. In 
this regard, Poland’s priorities are shaped by the development of its own defence market and concern 
about the effects of liberalisation. Although it is not yet a leading player in the field, the geostrategic costs 
of ignoring its concerns would be high. It is worth elaborating its priorities. 
What Is on the Table: The Commission’s “Carrots” and “Sticks” 
The bulk of the preparatory work for the summit has been undertaken by the European Commission, albeit 
with input from the High Representative, the EDA, European Parliament, and the Member States, and 
resulted in the Communication of 24 July 2013, “Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and 
security sector.” Acknowledging that defence is ultimately the prerogative of the Member States, the 
Communication’s focus is on existing policies in the areas of the internal defence market, industrial policy, 
research and innovation, space technologies, and energy, as these areas were found to warrant 
Commission funding and instruments to facilitate cooperation, generate skills and economic growth, 
support innovation and the competitiveness of European defence companies, and eliminate obstacles to EU 
defence trade. 
Building on past Commission proposals,3 the Communication provides a set of initial proposals in the form 
of “sticks” and “carrots” to find ways towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector. 
Strengthening the internal market for security and defence material is the key priority and is classified as  
a “carrot” equally for Member States and industries. It will be ensured by the full transposition of the 
Defence Procurement and the Transfers Directives of 2009, but facilitated by a proposed “stick” the 
Commission proposes to monitor the openness of national defence markets, based on an assessment of 
derogations made with regard to Art. 346 of the Lisbon Treaty and the phasing out of offsets (countertrade 
agreements, obliging the successful winner of a tender to invest in the defence industry of the customer 
country). From the Commission’s point of view, and in times of “common defence policy” and “open 
defence market,” governments really cannot justify recourse to such an anachronism as derogation of EU 
law in the defence sector.  
At the same time, the Commission intends to explore the possibilities for improving security of armaments 
supply and lifting the control of strategic defence industrial and technological assets, as well as promoting  
a more competitive industry. To this end, the Commission proposes to explore the creation of “hybrid 
standards” for equipment with military and civilian applications (i.e., remotely piloted aircraft systems, or 
drones), common certification (i.e., military airworthiness), ways to guarantee the supply of raw materials, 
and initiatives to support small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Dual-use (military and civilian) 
synergies will be exploited with the objective to reinforce innovation and foster cooperation by co-funding 
research and development or generally setting incentives for industry to engage in emerging technologies 
(i.e., drones). The Commission also foresees a similarly ambitious approach in space issues and energy 
consumption.  
An interesting option included in the Communication concerns an effort to strengthen the international 
dimension of EU companies by exploring their potential to break into third markets. But, tellingly, this is at 
present unrealistic: whenever any major contract for military equipment is on offer elsewhere in the world, 
Europeans tend to compete against one another, even when this comes at the expense of all the rules of 
reason and market success. It shows how domestic interests prevail regardless of the “carrots” on offer at 
the European level. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the Communication receives general support from Member 
                                                          
 
3 The 2007 Communication, “A strategy for a stronger and more competitive European defence industry,” paved the way for the 
EC’s defence package, i.e., Directives 2009/81 EC and the 2009/43/EC. 
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States when it comes to the identification of key industrial shortfalls and the inclination for defence-
capability reinforcement, but the “sticks” and “carrots” are perceived differently by each country. Some, for 
instance, see in the proposals potential gains to be had from the increased transparency and reduced 
fragmentation (although the defence market is seen as atypical).  
Nevertheless, the analysis will appeal to some countries more than others for a simple reason: the 
Commission looks at the European defence market from the perspective of the biggest defence 
manufacturing countries.  
Mapping Member State Influence:  
The Downgrading of Central Eastern Europe Interests? 
European governments have had several occasions to express their opinion on the topics being prepared 
for the European Council, including within the framework of meetings with the EDA, with the European 
Commission, as well as bilaterally and multilaterally in various configurations, and finally at ministerial levels 
with the participation of ministers for the economy (COCOM), foreign ministers (FAC), or defence 
ministers meetings (Dublin in May and Vilnius in September). But it was only as December loomed that the 
positions of some countries crystallised, as shown at the November FAC, where the United Kingdom and 
Poland refused to back down on what they saw as unfavourable wordings in the conclusions, leading to 
delays in their adoption.   
As the forerunners of the European defence-industrial sector, the so called Letter of Intent (LoI) 
countries—France, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Great Britain and Italy—unquestionably had the greatest 
impact on the Communication (although some of the proposals went beyond even their control). These 
countries possess a significant national defence-industrial base, generally represent 80% of the EU defence 
market, are competitive and innovative, and have the best chances of holding their own in the face of global 
competition. Unsurprisingly, they are supportive of actions aimed at strengthening SMEs and dual-use R&T 
that might in turn prove useful in helping their already competitive defence industries to go global.  
And, for similar reasons, the LoI countries share three concerns: Art. 346, strategic-asset control (i.a., their 
autonomy to define government-to-government sales) and offsets on third markets as requested by third-
country governments. In other words, they reject any new regulatory approach or interpretation of the 
defence package. They opt for national control of strategic assets to be made inherent in the national 
framework. And they consider the limitation of offsets on third markets as potentially damaging to the 
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The parts of the Communication that the LoI 
countries support or neglect thus reflect the interests of their national defence industries, and are carefully 
selected on the basis of projected benefits (i.e., SMEs, R&T) or losses (Art. 346) connected with the 
liberalisation and opening up of the market.  
Besides this, individual LoI countries express stronger or weaker feelings depending on the issues at hand. 
For example, the United Kingdom puts great emphasis on improving the level of competition in the EU 
market, on supporting SME growth and expanding innovation, but only with market-driven tools. The UK 
also, predictably, presents a strong position on matters that would require the UK’s support for further 
action. For that reason it opposes any new regulations and disregards ideas that impinge upon national 
sovereignty or its competences or duplicates efforts, especially in the defence-export context. It is notable 
that the UK is against offsets within the EU; however, when it comes to supporting national exports and 
other external defence trade issues, such as third-country offsets, its position firmly disregards Commission 
efforts.  
The trouble is that the needs of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have scarcely been taken 
into account by the Commission, and there are clashes of interest. 
France in its positions jointly expressed with Germany underlines the role of free access to the European 
defence market, of the open competition principles, monitoring of the Defence Procurement Directive and 
adequate application of the Transfer Directive, as well as its support for the Commission’s intention to 
phase-out offsets within the EU. On these issues, the Polish national interest does not correspond with the 
French and German interests. What’s more, whereas France strongly supports improving the 
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competitiveness of the European defence industry and the significance of standardization and certification in 
the interoperability of armed forces, Poland shares the opinion that efforts in the latter fields should be 
based on existing national institutions dealing with those issues (i.e., in the EDA) without appointing 
additional institutions. Poland is in favour of ideas to support defence-related SMEs through clusters, 
structural funds and other means of financial support and dual-use technology development.  
There is also a potential clash between the CEE countries and large national firms. In their position papers, 
industry generally supports the direction of the Commission’s intervention in the defence sector. The 
obvious complaints concern the low levels of spending on defence, lack of significant new programmes and 
bureaucratic obstacles to cooperation. At the same time, they see other problems, such as technological 
dependencies, lack of synergies in European and national research programmes, the need for improvement 
of defence technology “branding” in European society, implementation of effective standardization, and 
ethical risks seen in defence investments by commercial financial institutions. Smaller firms, such as those in 
the CEE, underline the potential threats of emphasising competitiveness issues, which tends to be 
considered an artificial barrier to tighten market competition and limit the chances for partnerships. 
The Polish “Decalogue” 
Due to the specificity of the domestic defence industry and national interests, Poland articulates a different 
approach towards the future of EDTIB to the one represented by the LoI countries. Poland claims that the 
European Union as a collection of 28 Member States should demonstrate in the defence-industrial sector 
greater understanding, and that which is appropriate for a truly Community approach. The EU should see 
this issue from more than the perspective of the major defence manufacturing countries and be able to 
predict the future consequences of its actions today. 
Along those lines, Poland supports the viewpoint that only a coherent political vision of CSDP development 
can form a sound basis for the long-term implementation of its strategic goals, which underpin capability 
development and reinforce the notion of a regionally balanced European defence industry. The 10 main 
priorities of the Polish position on European defence market development, in brief, are:  
I. To have the EU recognise the concept of balanced development of EDTIB, which rests on the 
assumption that the EU proposals should take into account the condition and needs of Member 
States in different parts of Europe, including security of supply aspects and not only the prospects 
for LoI industries. According to Poland, the development of EDTIB needs to follow a balanced path 
that ensures the essential defence and security interests of all of the Member States and promotes 
sustainable growth in all countries and regions of the EU. The balanced development concept also 
views open competition as a threat when used as the sole method for building EDTIB without 
acknowledgesing national defence industries in all of the EU countries as the basis for EDTIB. The 
balanced development concept would lead to reducing the gaps between industries across the EU 
regions as a condition for its effective development. Therefore, when defining EDTIB, also the 
enterprises of the defence-related sectors should be taken into account.  
Also important is the convergence of opinion on the optimal way of developing EDTIB provided by 
the European Economic and Social Committee to the Commission’s communication on 17 October 
2013 (CCMI/116). The committee’s opinion stated that one of the main problems of building 
EDTIB is the profound difference in the potential of the main defence equipment-producing 
countries (LoI) and the other members. It follows that EDTIB should be built in a balanced way in 
all EU Member States because if the conditions for competition in the internal European market 
become too harsh, it may adversely affect the competitiveness of the European defence industry in 
the global market, and the only companies to benefit from competition of European companies will 
be the defence industries of third countries (non-European).  
II. To reject any new regulatory approach regarding directives 2009/81 and 2009/49 and the use of 
Art. 346 TFEU. Poland considers attempts to politically prohibit the use of Art. 346 TFEU as 
interference in the essential national security interests of the state. Therefore, the only acceptable 
way forward is to continue with the EC’s assessment of defence-package implementation and its 
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impact on Member States in order to provide its report to the EP by June 2016. On this point, the 
Polish view is shared to some extent by the LoI countries. 
III. To keep offsets. Poland considers the intention to phase-out offsets incoherent with the 
Interpretative Communication provided by the European Commission in 2006. The concept of 
offsets in the defence sector is strictly linked to essential national security interests and therefore 
the idea of phasing-out offsets in the EU should depend solely on national policies and national 
authorities. Offsets should not be considered by the Commission as simply a market distortion. On 
the contrary, Poland argues that offsets are beneficial for the development of EDTIB as it gives 
opportunities for maintaining and modernizing Member States’ defence and industrial capabilities 
and is vital for future growth in the European defence market. Moreover, offsets may also result in 
better and more efficient achievements and increase cooperation among defence industries in the 
field of R&T. 
IV. To respect national frameworks inherent in strategic asset control. Poland holds as an essential 
national security interest to keep control of strategic defence assets, as they contribute to long-
term security of supply. Moreover, this view is generally shared by the LoI countries.   
V. To make it easier for SMEs to access the defence market. For Poland, it means not only creating 
fair and non-discriminatory reference terms for defence industrial capabilities development within 
SMEs but also reducing the regulatory burden for SMEs in the defence sector. The aim here should 
be to foster innovation in the dual-use market with a focus on creating better opportunities for 
SMEs.  Although the majority of Polish defence companies do not fulfil the SME criteria, Poland 
supports the idea of plugging in a range of defence-related and dual-use enterprises to the national 
defence and technological bases in order to support the development of the core defence 
industries. To meet this aim, the reconstruction of the prime contractors’ supply chains and 
contributions to a mechanism of a level the playing field are necessary to support other actions 
offered by the current directives. 
Important elements in the formation of European industrial policy with regard to SMEs are based 
on proposed instruments for strengthening SME competences, such as the EU’s “Horizon 2020” 
programme, which was accepted on 3 December 2013, and the COSME programme. To Polish 
SMEs, these seem to be proper starting points for mitigating differences and extending SME access 
to innovative dual-use technologies. Another positive aspect of SME policy that wins support from 
the Polish side is regional specialisation with regard to defence Centres of Excellence and other 
forms of networking and clustering that promote synergies in civil-military cooperation. 
VI. To consider using European structural funds more widely, especially to support public and private 
ventures in developing new technologies in dual-use fields. Poland strongly supports this instrument 
as a backbone of the EU economy and which could provide greater opportunities for the defence 
sector, as well as one that has proved its effectiveness in reskilling the defence sector in the last 
two decades. 
VII. To promote participation in R&T programmes. Poland considers bilateral and multinational R&T 
projects to be a key element in the maintenance and improvement of the competitiveness of the 
defence sector, both in Poland and the EU. So far, Poland has had little chance to benefit from 
joining trans-European supply chains and becoming involved in collaborative weapons investment 
programs. The adequate forum for specific R&T projects and dual-use capabilities was the EDA, and 
Poland would like to follow this model of cooperation in future projects.  
VIII. To join capability development projects with dual-use applications. Poland is deeply interested in 
taking part in EU flagship initiatives such as aerial surveillance and drone programmes (RPAS), air-
to-air refuelling (AAR), cyber warfare programmes, or government satellite communications 
(GOVSATCOM). The Commission’s intention is to provide financial support for cooperation on 
particular programmes coordinated between the EC and the EDA, and is particularly welcomed by 
Poland. 
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IX. To prevent the standards and certification process from implementing additional, restrictive criteria 
that would limit the number of enterprises able to fulfil them. The standardization and certification 
process is fully supported by Poland, since it is in line with the need to achieve greater military 
interoperability within the EU, but no additional institutions should be created at the EU level for 
that reason, and the process should not enforce new certification models, generate extra service 
costs, or become a means for additional competition on the market. 
X. To develop an effective consultative mechanism. Poland considers it necessary to strengthen 
cooperation amongst European industries. The EDA platform is a positive example of this, but the 
thematic scope of consultations is limited only to the agency’s projects. Hopefully, a similar form of 
a consultative mechanism for industrial partners would also limit the current common practice of 
European institutions talking mostly to defence industry leaders. 
Conclusions 
Defence-industrial matters rank high on the December European Council agenda. But the ambitious 
proposals presented by the Commission on Europe’s defence industry and market issues will only have an 
impact if they receive strong political backing from EU governments, and the extreme expectations of 
various interlocutors show how difficult and important are the issues put on the table for consideration. It 
is unlikely that Member States will accept all of the Commission’s ideas at the Council in December, such as 
those with international aspects, but some proposals may receive the support of most governments and the 
industry, with the SME and R&T issues as examples. However, the fate of other significant issues related to 
the opening of the European defence market, such as the narrowing of the scope of Art. 346 TFEU, its  
interpretation, or the acceptance of offsets, is still to be decided. The chances to accommodate the 
interests of all of the players are hardly possible. For Poland, these matters have even greater validity as 
they tend to define the next milestone in the definition of the future prospects of its important defence 
industry. Any kind of compromise reached on the 19–20th December in practice should lead to  
“A [regionally balanced,] sound, innovative and competitive European Defence Technological and Industrial 
base (EDTIB) [,which] is a prerequisite for stimulating innovation, growth and jobs and securing up-to-date 
capabilities.”4 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
4 The Council Conclusions on CSDP adopted on 26 November 2013. 
